Tuesday, March 27, 2007

The Vineyard Man MV

Nice korean drama OST MV......
Part I
Part II

Saturday, March 17, 2007

A Tale From Dr. Marc Faber


It was autumn, and the Red Indians on the remote reservation asked their new chief if the winter was going to be cold or mild. Since he was a Red Indian chief in a modern society, he couldn’t tell what the weather was going to be. Nevertheless, to be on the safe side, he told his tribe that the winter was indeed going to be cold and that the members of the village should collect wood to be prepared.

But, being a practical leader, after several days he got an idea. He went to the phone booth, called the National Weather Service and asked, “Is the coming winter going to be cold?”

“It looks like this winter is going to be quite cold indeed,” the meteorologist at the weather service responded.

So the chief went back to his people and told them to collect even more wood.

A week later, he called the National Weather Service again.

“Is it going to be a very cold winter?”

“Yes,” the man at the National Weather Service again replied, “It’s definitely going to be a very cold winter.”

The chief again went back to his people and ordered them to collect every scrap of wood they could find.

Two weeks later, he called the National Weather Service again.

“Are you absolutely sure that the winter is going to be very cold?”

“Absolutely,” the man replied.

“It’s going to be one of the coldest winters ever.”

“How can you be so sure?” the chief asked.

The weatherman replied, “The Red Indians are collecting wood like crazy.”

Monday, March 12, 2007

Thursday, March 08, 2007

Chairman's Letter 2006 6

"We’ve found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels."

Wednesday, March 07, 2007

Chairman's Letter 2006 5

"Let me end this section by telling you about one of the good guys of Wall Street, my long-time friend Walter Schloss, who last year turned 90. From 1956 to 2002, Walter managed a remarkably successful investment partnership, from which he took not a dime unless his investors made money. My admiration for Walter, it should be noted, is not based on hindsight. A full fifty years ago, Walter was my sole recommendation to a St. Louis family who wanted an honest and able investment manager. Walter did not go to business school, or for that matter, college. His office contained one file cabinet in 1956; the number mushroomed to four by 2002. Walter worked without a secretary, clerk or bookkeeper, his only associate being his son, Edwin, a graduate of the North Carolina School Of the Arts.

Walter and Edwin never came within a mile of inside information. Indeed, they used “outside” information only sparingly, generally selecting securities by certain simple statistical methods Walter learned while working for Ben Graham. When Walter and Edwin were asked in 1989 by Outstanding Investors Digest,

“How would you summarize your approach?” Edwin replied, “We try to buy stocks cheap.” So much for

Modern Portfolio Theory, technical analysis, macroeconomic thoughts and complex algorithms.

Following a strategy that involved no real risk – defined as permanent loss of capital – Walter produced results over his 47 partnership years that dramatically surpassed those of the S&P 500. It’s particularly noteworthy that he built this record by investing in about 1,000 securities, mostly of a lackluster type. A few big winners did not account for his success. It’s safe to say that had millions of investment managers made trades by a) drawing stock names from a hat; b) purchasing these stocks in comparable amounts when Walter made a purchase; and then c) selling when Walter sold his pick, the luckiest of them would not have come close to equaling his record. There is simply no possibility that what Walter achieved over 47 years was due to chance.

I first publicly discussed Walter’s remarkable record in 1984. At that time “efficient market theory” (EMT) was the centerpiece of investment instruction at most major business schools. This theory, as then most commonly taught, held that the price of any stock at any moment is not demonstrably mispriced, which means that no investor can be expected to overperform the stock market averages using only publicly-available information (though some will do so by luck). When I talked about Walter 23 years ago, his record forcefully contradicted this dogma.

And what did members of the academic community do when they were exposed to this new and important evidence? Unfortunately, they reacted in all-too-human fashion: Rather than opening their minds, they closed their eyes. To my knowledge no business school teaching EMT made any attempt to study Walter’s performance and what it meant for the school’s cherished theory. Instead, the faculties of the schools went merrily on their way presenting EMT as having the certainty of scripture. Typically, a finance instructor who had the nerve to question EMT had about as much chance of major promotion as Galileo had of being named Pope.

Tens of thousands of students were therefore sent out into life believing that on every day the price of every stock was “right” (or, more accurately, not demonstrably wrong) and that attempts to evaluate businesses – that is, stocks – were useless. Walter meanwhile went on overperforming, his job made easier by the misguided instructions that had been given to those young minds. After all, if you are in the shipping business, it’s helpful to have all of your potential competitors be taught that the earth is flat. Maybe it was a good thing for his investors that Walter didn’t go to college."

Tuesday, March 06, 2007

Chairman's Letter 2006 4

"When someone with experience proposes a deal to someone with money, too often the fellow with money ends up with the experience, and the fellow with experience ends up with the money."

Monday, March 05, 2007

Chairman's Letter 2006 3

"Corporate bigwigs often complain about government spending, criticizing bureaucrats who they say spend taxpayers’ money differently from how they would if it were their own. But sometimes the financial behavior of executives will also vary based on whose wallet is getting depleted. Here’s an illustrative tale from my days at Salomon. In the 1980s the company had a barber, Jimmy by name, who came in weekly to give free haircuts to the top brass. A manicurist was also on tap. Then, because of a cost-cutting drive, patrons were told to pay their own way. One top executive (not the CEO) who had previously visited Jimmy weekly went immediately to a once-every-three-weeks schedule."

Sunday, March 04, 2007

Chairman's Letter 2006 2

"Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful."

"Temperament is also important. Independent thinking, emotional stability, and a keen understanding of both human and institutional behavior is vital to long-term investment success. I’ve seen a lot of very smart people who have lacked these virtues."

Saturday, March 03, 2007

Chairman's Letter 2006 1

"Size seems to make many organizations slow-thinking, resistant to change and smug. In Churchill’s words: “We shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us.” Here’s a telling fact: Of the ten non-oil companies having the largest market capitalization in 1965 – titans such as General Motors, Sears, DuPont and Eastman Kodak – only one made the 2006 list." -- Warren Buffet, Chairman's Letter 2006

Thursday, March 01, 2007

The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying


Dialog between an author of "The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying", Sogyal Rinpoche and Zen Master, Sheng Yen.

"西藏有句谚语说,如果你愈想走得快反而更慢到达,慢慢走反而还会快点到。"
(There is a Tibetan proverb: You would be reach destination later if you wish to walk faster; you would reach there earlier if you walk slowly.)

"有两件事是人最大的敌人,那就是太多期望和太多的恐惧,"
(There are 2 biggest enemies of us -- too much hopes and too much fears.)

“没有一个东西是禅宗的心要,这就是禅宗的心要."
(There is no core value of Zen, That is a core value of Zen.)

Read more from here.

Black Tuesday -- 27th February 2007

Is "Black Tuesday" is a stand alone stock market crisis?
What's the implication to the overall market?
Will people will shy away from investing in stock market? .... etc....

These questions arise after Black Tuesday which happened on 27th February 2007. It started from Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets because of the rumour that Chinese regulator would impose a capital gain tax to cold down the soon to be bubble market.

Similar crisis happened in May 2006. While the market lost quite significant wealth in the short period, the market rebound after few months and passing through several new history high, especially in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Ho Chi Minn and Singapore.

While the incidence on Tuesday hurt many investors especially retail investors who bet on margin/loan and those deal with Day Trade and they may shy away from the market for a short period, they tend to forget and return to the market in the shortest period. My friends who gain 2 weeks ago and bet more in the hope that they will gain more but the incidence on Tuesday made their hope disappear. The overconfidence turns to sad mood after losing monies in the market. When you compare the "prediction" of those fund managers, chartists, technical analysts, media and so forth, you will puzzle that their "prediction" could change to reverse side in 2 weeks time. 2 weeks ago, they were overconfidence that the market will surpass new high but now all change direction.

Will people stop speculate/gamble on stocks? Very unlikely.... because

"What I learn from history is people never learn from history." -- Warren Buffett