Thursday, December 11, 2008

Media Mayhem


Simply nowhere in the mass media have I seen it reported how strong third-quarter earnings were. Roughly two-thirds of firms reported higher earnings through Nov. 25. Also, two-thirds reported earnings stronger than analysts' latest expectations. Yet we only heard about the laggards. Excluding financials, 67% of companies reported earnings better than the year before, and 68% exceeded expectations.

On Oct. 13 the S&P 500's dividend yield was 3.74%. That means it exceeded the yield on the ten-year Treasury note for the first time since 1958. Did you see a headline about that?

Business inventories are at record lows for the start of a recession, and that fact should make the recession milder. These times will pass. Because stocks are so cheap, a big bull market will emerge.

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Wednesday, December 03, 2008

Mainland Commentators CSI....

1) 温元凯:牛市一万点 -- 《中国大趋势》, 《闯荡华尔街》, 《牛市一万点》

2) 金岩石:沪指8000点不是梦 -- 虚拟经济和实体经济的融合,事实上已经改变了中国人的财富心态。很多人没有意识到,如果现在把中国经济画一张饼,房市占40多万亿元,股市占30多万亿元,实体经济占不到30万亿元。

3) 水皮:3500 点是大底 -- 水皮,原名吕平波,《华夏时报》总编辑。

4) 徐滇庆:为楼市上涨赌一把

5) 谢国忠:孤独的“主流” -- 谢国忠的出名最早源于他的三大预言。1997年香港回归前两个月,刚加入摩根士丹利的他就预测,香港房地产将暴跌50%,当时被外资圈视为无稽之谈。但很快,此事被他言中。随后,他又在亚洲金融危机爆发之前发表预见,清楚地看到“亚洲经济有巨大的结构性问题”。1997年夏天,谢国忠预见了中国的“通缩 ”,并意识到中国经济将从短缺走向过剩。当时,中国经济增长维持在8%的高水平,很多人对中国经济持乐观态度。2004年5月,谢国忠首次预警“中国房地产泡沫”。当年10月,他更加坚决地表示“上海的房地产泡沫可能还会持续几个月,不会超过一年”,并卖掉自家在上海的房产以明心志。2007年年初,谢国忠再次唱空楼市:中国房价2008年将进入调整期,2008年或2009年将进入谷底。

谢国忠认为,由于中国信贷增长的大部分都投进了房地产行业,变成了大批的楼房住宅,假如这些流动资金迅速撤离,中国的房地产行业将会遭遇危机。并强调,国际游资是导致国内房地产市场过热的主要原因。

在谢国忠的预言生涯中,房地产是被否定次数最多的领域。在一片房市繁荣论中,他的泡沫论显得孤立而脆弱。同时,他的股市泡沫论也受到众多质疑。2007年5 月8日,谢国忠在接受路透社采访时表示,全球股市大繁荣将在2008年前结束,与世界范围的经济衰退同步,而中国股市也即将崩盘。流动性过度、通胀上升和估值较高这些因素综合起来,将导致全球股市很快崩盘。

2007年5月9日,谢国忠预测,中国股市一年后将暴跌。“一般股市上涨的周期是2~3年,中国股市开始上升是在2005年下半年,到现在为止两年不到,如果历史重复的话,那就还有一年,每次泡沫都是市盈率到60倍左右,就要出现暴跌了,中国目前是40倍左右。”

6) 左小蕾:“空姐”不再谈股市 -- 吴敬琏、谢国忠、成思危和左小蕾于其间频频给火热的市场泼冷水,而作为“唱空派”领军人物中唯一的女性,左小蕾并未因此受到多头责难的“豁免”,被戏称为“唱空大姐”。

2006 年以来,境内股市开始启动,股评家乐观的声音从没间断过。在这场群体性癫狂中,似乎人人都成了巴菲特,甚至散户都开始给机构推荐股票。此时,左小蕾却以唱空A股而为广大股民所熟知。曾写下系列文章《切忌好了伤疤忘了痛 理性对待股市大涨》、《资金助股市大涨快速变化有违资本市场发展规律》、《市场应警惕股市系统性风险 量增更需质变》、《股价岂能放卫星 价格重估不是价值重估》、《不要与政策博弈》等。

7) 宋鸿兵:与泡沫共赢 要知道何时抽身 -- 《货币战争》-- 如今,国内很多商业银行成了上市公司,这些上市银行实际上非常依赖股价和房价,行情好的时候,公司利润增长30%~40%,很多利润都来源于金融投资。所以,这种利润增长是不可靠的,是随时都有可能逆转的。

8) 巴曙松:散户不要像义和团一样勇猛

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Monday, November 10, 2008

An article by Warren Buffett on Forbes on 6th August 1979

Stocks now sell at levels that should produce long-term returns far superior to bonds. Yet pensions managers, usually encouraged by corporate sponsors they must necessarily please ("whose bread I eat, his song I sing"), are pouring funds in record proportions into bonds.

Many corporate managers, in fact, exhibit a bit of schizophrenia regarding equities. They consider their own stocks to be screamingly attractive. But, concomitantly, they stamp approval on pension policies rejecting purchases of common stocks in general. And the boss, while wearing his acquisition hat, will eagerly bid 150% to 200% of book value for businesses typical of corporate America but, wearing his pension hat, will scorn investment in similar companies at book value. Can his own talents be so unique that he is justified both in paying 200 cents on the dollar for a business if he can get his hands on it, and in rejecting it as an unwise pension investment at 100 cents on the dollar if it must be left to be run by his companions at the Business Roundtable?

A second argument is made that there are just too many question marks about the near future; wouldn't it be better to wait until things clear up a bit? You know the prose: "Maintain buying reserves until current uncertainties are resolved," etc. Before reaching for that crutch, face up to two unpleasant facts: The future is never clear; you pay a very high price in the stock market for a cheery consensus. Uncertainty actually is the friend of the buyer of long-term values.

Managers currently opting for lower equity ratios either have a highly negative opinion of future American business results or expect to be nimble enough to dance back into stocks at even lower levels. There may well be some period in the near future when financial markets are demoralized and much better buys are available in equities; that possibility exists at all times. But you can be sure that at such a time the future will seem neither predictable nor pleasant. Those now awaiting a "better time" for equity investing are highly likely to maintain that posture until well into the next bull market.

Read more, click here....

Comment: Isn't it a similar scenario after 40 years now? "A person who does not learn from the history does not has his story."

Friday, November 07, 2008

Top Brands of Beer in the World

雪花啤酒两大股东是国际啤酒集团SABMiller(SAB.L: 行情)与中国华润创业(0291.HK: 行情),其发展势头迅猛,因中国已取代美国成为全球最大啤酒市场。

Plato公布的前10大啤酒品牌分别为:Bud Light、雪花、百威、英博(INTB.BR: 行情)旗下巴西品牌Skol、ModeloGMODELOC.M旗下的科罗娜、喜力(HEIN.AS: 行情)、英博旗下另一巴西品牌Brahma、Coors Light(TAP.N: 行情)、SABMiller旗下的米勒淡啤和中国的青岛啤酒(0168.HK: 行情)。

该研究机构称,世界消费量排名前五的啤酒市场依次为中国、美国、俄罗斯、巴西和德国。

研究报告同时预期2008年全球啤酒消费量增长不到3%。2007年增速则为5.6%。

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Derivative Trading Losses in Recent Times

2008年10月:中信泰富(0267.HK: 行情)披露,在外汇期权合约上潜在亏损20亿美元.公司称其财务管理人员未获授权而从事澳元和欧元交易.

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Thursday, November 06, 2008

Rebound Ranking for Stock Markets Around the World

As at 6th November 2008:

全球反弹榜

股市 近期低点 最新收盘 反弹幅度
俄罗斯 549.06点 773.37点 40.85%
中国香港 10676.29点 14840.16点 39.00%
巴西 29400点 40254.8点 36.92%
日本 6994.90点 9521.24点 36.12%
印度 7697.39点 10343.01点 34.37%
韩国 892.16点 1181.50点 32.43%
奥地利 1675.89点 2210点 31.87%
德国 4014.60点 5278.04点 31.47%
阿根廷 858.55点 1123.11点 30.81%
墨西哥 16480.01点 21535.27点 30.68%
瑞典 369.72点 477.88点 29.25%
新加坡 1473.77点 1876.60点 27.33%
印尼 1089.34点 1381.98点 26.86%
英国 3665.21点 4639.5点 26.58%
法国 2959.29点 3691.09点 24.73%
西班牙 836.82点 1041.89点 24.51%
美国道琼斯 7773.71点 9625.28点 23.81%
意大利 14521.00点 17750点 22.23%
泰国 383.63点 467.76点 21.93%
台湾地区 4110.09点 4978.26点 21.12%
芬兰 760.06点 916.78点 20.62%
越南 313.63点 377.83点 20.47%
瑞士 5265.86点 6399.98点 20.40%
葡萄牙 1907.82点 2290.17点 20.04%
美国纳斯达克 1493.00点 1780.12点 19.23%
菲律宾 1684.75点 2006.21点 19.09%
加拿大 8537.34点 10116.58点 18.50%
埃及 405.533点 479.7点 18.29%
澳大利亚 3693.90点 4336.6点 17.40%
马来西亚 801.27点 914.71点 14.16%
新西兰 2687.100点 2886.11点 7.41%
上海综指 1664.92点 1760.61点 5.74%
深圳成指 5577.23点 5865.78点 5.17%
冰岛 640.04点 644.18点 0.65%

Except for Iceland where really in the mess, the least rebound in term of percentage include:
1) Australia and New Zealand: both of them have their own trouble: their currency depreciation against USD in the past few weeks about 30%.
2) China and Malaysia: Their currency rate is pegged to the basket of currencies and not freely traded outside domestic market, high foreign reserve.

Notes to be taken:
1) While HK rebound 39%, Shanghai and ShenZhen rebound about 5% only. Is HK overvalued or Shanghai and ShenZhen undervalued?
2) While BRI (Brazil, Russia and India) rebound more than 30%, C (China) rebound about 5% only. Same question applies: do BRI overvalued or C undervalued?

What's the indication do you get from the information?

Most often, success contains the seed of failure and vice versa.....

Wednesday, November 05, 2008

John Bogle comment on US markets on Nov 4th 2008



The hard-charging, 79-year-old founder of the nation's second-largest largest mutual fund company said he expected the earnings of companies in the Standard & Poor's 500 Index .SPX to grow at a rate of about 7 percent annually over the next decade.
That should pave the way for returns on U.S. stocks of around 10 percent, according to his calculations that combine a projected earnings growth rate with a three percent dividend yield generated by stocks in the S&P-500 Index.
"The value of the U.S. stock market was $18 trillion a year ago. And now it's about $9.5 trillion or let's call it $10 trillion with today's rally. Anyone who believes that American business is worth $8 trillion less than it was a year ago I think is a fool," he told Reuters in a telephone interview.

"So there was some water in the system, some hot air in the system, and we blew it out, but I think we have overblown it," he said.

Bogle left the Vanguard helm after a 1996 heart transplant, and now often castigates the mutual fund industry as a marketing vehicle run not so much by investment professionals on behalf of investors as by short-term minded entrepreneurs.
"Institutional money managers, including the managers at mutual funds, have a lot to answer for," he said.
"If they were professional security analysts, where were they when they looked at the balance sheets of those banks?" he said in reference to banks that took huge write-downs for their exposure to losses in subprime mortgages that snowballed into the worst financial crisis since the 1930s.
"They joined the speculative frenzy, turning over stocks 100 percent a year. It has nothing to do with investing. It's a great big marketing business,"
he said.


Monday, November 03, 2008

Face off.........

来自摩根大通的预期显示,在未来的三年,蒙牛乳业的业绩将遭遇滑铁卢,预计2008年净利润较上年下降88%至1.216亿元,2009年和2010年料净亏损2.669亿元和2.226亿元。

而来自内蒙古自治区政府的数据显示,乳业因三聚氰胺遭受的损失惨重。据一份来自内蒙古的数据显示,伊利、蒙牛下架产品价值已达64亿元,预计未来还将损失36亿元人民币,企业订单减少八成,日收奶量不足原来的五分之一。

“蒙牛的资金的确很紧张,我们已经从预备费中各拿出5000万元分别对蒙牛和伊利进行救助,此外还准备免除两家企业未来四个月的增值税。”内蒙古政府一位人士对记者说。

在产品下架及召回让蒙牛损失了近50亿元之外,在9月23日,蒙牛乳业在港交所复牌,当日即暴跌60.25%,蒙牛总裁牛根生等高管持股市值单日缩水就达49.4亿港元,而此后,由于国际金融危机,蒙牛乳业的股价同样未能企稳。

而 此时,国际投行从之前的一致唱多到现在开始一致唱空。如美林预计,蒙牛2008年亏损1800万元,目标价由15港元降至9.09港元;摩根大通甚至按照 净资产估值给出了3.8港元的目标价。10月31日,蒙牛乳业股价仍然延续了跌势,已经跌到7.5港元左右。而蒙牛乳业年内的最高价曾达到34港元。

在一位不愿具名的分析师看来,继续唱空蒙牛,也许正是投行们为了配合逢低收购蒙牛股票而演出的大戏。“在二级市场暴跌的股票虽然给投资者带来了巨大损失,但也给虎视眈眈的外资以绝好的机会。中国上空有两只秃鹫,一个是产业资本,一个是金融资本,现在都飞到内蒙古了。”


如瑞银,目前持有的蒙牛乳业股份为12.23%,摩根大通持有5.77%,澳邦银行持有5.8%,花旗4.89%。

而在此时,瑞银 的动作颇为引人注目。蒙牛最大的机构股东瑞银日前发表研究报告称,维持对蒙牛的卖出评级,同时决定将蒙牛目标价由11.55港元下调至7.44港元。报告 进一步称,决定依次分别下调蒙牛乳业2008~2010年的每股盈利至0.33元、0.33元和0.47元。

然而,与其他投行纷纷坚持蒙牛乳业股票不同,瑞银却一面唱空一面做多。8月22日,瑞银持股比例为7.99%,在蒙牛停牌前后曾减持至7.71%,但在持续对蒙牛唱空之后,到9月25日,瑞银却突然买入,持股比例达到12.23%。


Read more, click here....

Saturday, October 18, 2008

Chairman's Memo

Below are some exceprts from Oaktree Capital Management L.P. Chairman, Howard Marks regarding the current market. The memo dated 15th October 2008. Click here to view full memo..... You need to download pdf file read to view it. Click here to download pdf reader.

"But in dealing with the future, we must think about two things: (a) what might happen and (b) the probability it will happen. During the crisis, lots of bad things seemed possible, but that didn’t mean they were going to happen. In times of crisis, people fail to make that distinction."

"In general, following the beliefs of the herd – and swinging with the pendulum – will give you average performance in the long run and can get you killed at the extremes."

"The message of The Black Swan is how important it is to realize that the things everyone rules out can still come to pass. That might be generalized into an understanding of the importance of skepticism. I’d define skepticism as not believing what you’re told or what “everyone” considers
true. In my opinion, it’s one of the most important requirements for successful investing. If you believe the story everyone else believes, you’ll do what they do. Usually you’ll buy at high prices and sell at lows. You’ll fall for tales of the “silver bullet” capable of delivering high returns without risk. You’ll buy what’s been doing well and sell what’s been doing poorly. And you’ll suffer losses in crashes and miss out when things recover from bottoms. In other words, you’ll be a conformist, not a maverick (an overused word these days); a follower, not a contrarian."

"Skepticism is what it takes to look behind a balance sheet, the latest miracle of financial engineering or the can’t-miss story. The idea being marketed by an investment banker or
broker has been prettied up for presentation. And usually it’s been doing well, making the tale more credible. Only a skeptic can separate the things that sound good and are from the things that sound good and aren’t. The best investors I know exemplify this trait. It’s an absolute necessity."

"Skepticism and pessimism aren’t synonymous. Skepticism calls for pessimism when optimism is excessive. But it also calls for optimism when pessimism is excessive. I’ll write some more on the subject, but it’s really as simple as that."

"I found very few who were optimistic; most were pessimistic to some degree. Some became genuinely depressed – even a few great investors I know. Increasingly negative tales of the coming meltdown were exchanged via email. No one applied skepticism, or said “that horror story’s unlikely to be true.” Pessimism fed on itself. People’s only concern was bullet-proofing their portfolios to get through the coming collapse, or raising enough cash to meet redemptions. The one thing they weren’t doing last week was making aggressive bids for securities. So prices fell and fell – the old expression is “gapped down” – several points at a time. The key – as usual – was to become skeptical of what “everyone” was saying and doing. One might have said, “Sure, the negative story may turn out to be true, but certainly it’s priced into the market. So there’s little to be gained from betting on it. On the other hand, if it turns out not to be true, the appreciation from today’s depressed levels will be enormous. I buy!” The negative story may have looked compelling, but it’s the positive story – which few believed – that held, and still holds, the greater potential for profit."

"Most people don’t repeat their mistakes; they make new ones."

"That’s the main reason why we shouldn’t expect there to be any limit on the resources thrown at the problem. All it will take is running the printing presses long enough to rebuild financial institutions’ capital accounts, make good guarantees and enable borrowers to roll over their outstanding debt, all of which is reckoned in nominal terms. The philosophical bridge of unlimited aid to private institutions appears to have been crossed, and printing the necessary money is unlikely to be an issue."

"In the longer term, we have to wonder about the effect on the world of a glut of newly printed dollars, sterling and euros. The reason owning printing presses makes repayment easy is that it lets a nation cheapen its currency. But one would think that more units of currency per unit of GDP means a debasement of the currency, and thus reduced purchasing power (read: higher inflation).
Walking along Hyde Park on Sunday, I saw a street vendor selling old stock certificates.
Do you have any banknotes, I asked? Anything from the Weimar Republic? For the last
few weeks, I’ve wanted to get some of those.
In Weimar Germany, the government enabled itself to pay World War I reparations by
cheapening its currency . . . literally. So the 1,000 mark note I bought was simply overstamped
One Million Marks in red. Voila! Now we’re all rich.

The mark fell from 60 to the U.S. dollar in early 1921 to 320 to the dollar in early 1922
and 8,000 to the dollar by the end of 1922. It’s hard to believe, but according to
Wikipedia (user-maintained and perhaps not always the most authoritative):
In December 1923 the exchange rate was 4,200,000,000,000 Marks to 1
U.S. dollar. In 1923, the rate of inflation hit 3.25 x 106 percent per month
(prices double every two days).
One of the firms printing these [new 100 trillion Mark] notes submitted an
invoice for 32,776,899,763,734,490,417.05 (3.28 x 1019, or 33 quintillion)
Marks. [That’s not a misprint.]
Lord Keynes judged the situation this way:
The inflationism of the currency systems of Europe has proceeded to
extraordinary lengths. The various belligerent governments, unable, or too
timid or too short-sighted to secure from loans or taxes the resources they
required, have printed notes for the balance.
But it’s not that easy. People with things to sell aren’t that stupid. So instead of 1,000
marks, a goat now costs one million marks. That piece of paper used to be a thousand
mark note – and now it’s a million mark note – but it still buys the same goat.
The benefit to the government is that it’s able to pay off its old nominal debts in currency
of which it suddenly has a lot more . . . but which no longer has much purchasing power.
So when repaid in the cheapened currency in 1923, the person to whom the government
owed 1,000 marks can only buy one-thousandth of a goat – not a whole goat as in 1920.

My late friend Henry Reichmann was a boy then, working as a busboy in a restaurant in
Berlin. He told me he used to be paid at lunchtime and immediately ran out to spend his
salary, since it would buy less if he waited until after work to shop.
That’s hyperinflation. Just as the Great Depression became a model during the credit
crisis, Weimar Germany gives us something to think about regarding our new future.
I’m not smart enough to know what’s coming, but I’m also not dumb enough to
think a few government actions on Monday were enough to solve all our problems.
At best, we usually substitute one problem for another – usually one later on in lieu of
today’s.
I don’t know what to do about this risk, whether it’ll come home to roost, or to what
extent. And I certainly don’t think hyperinflation can be assigned a high enough
probability to make it worth doing much about. But it may cause one to rethink holdings
of low-yielding, flight-to-quality-elevated, long-term Treasurys."

"I’ve believed for many years that just as success carries within itself the seeds of failure (see 2003-08), so does failure carry the seeds of success."

"a forest fire: a year after, bright green shoots grow from the ashes; in fact, I think they’re fertilized by the ashes."

"a quote from Warren Buffett, and often it’s the same one:
The less prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the
prudence with which we should conduct our own affairs."

"When others conduct their affairs with excessive negativism, it’s worth being positive."

"That doesn’t mean it can’t decline further, or that a bull market’s about to start. But it does mean the negatives are on the table, optimism is thoroughly lacking, and the greater long-term risk probably lies in not investing."

Note: Oaktree Capital Management L.P. is a fund manager that HQ based in US and manages USD 54.5 Billion assets.

Monday, October 13, 2008

Face Off Again?




9月29日,沃伦?巴菲特宣布以每股港币8元的价格认购2.25亿股比亚迪公司的股份,约占比亚迪总股本的10%。受此影响,比亚迪股价大涨,港股及国内A股相关概念炒作不断。

显然,关注比亚迪的并非只有巴菲特一人。理财周报独家获悉,就在此前两天,国内曾有多家基金公司前往比亚迪进行了考察。当然,他们并不晓得巴菲特认购之事。

有趣的是,这些很多事后追捧巴菲特价值投资的国内投资人士,在当时恰恰做出了与巴菲特完全相反的判断。他们认为比亚迪估值偏高,需谨慎买入。


考察完比亚迪,十几位基金公司人士的总体感觉是,比亚迪虽然基本面尚好,但人员流失严重,原材料成本上升。上半年虽然收入增加,但因成本上升缘故, 利润也在下降。因此,感觉比亚迪与其他同类企业一样,基本上没有摆脱本年度整体经济下行的大环境。而且估值也不低。因此,基金公司的判断是“买入有风险, 需谨慎。”

在基金公司作出判断几个小时后,就有消息传出巴菲特将要出手。很多分析师的态度一下子又有了180度大转弯。


2007年9月以来,受与富士康诉讼案的影响,比亚迪的股价步入下滑通道,从77港元的最高点一路下跌到8.4港元。

股价的下跌强化了市场上的质疑,2008年9月初,BNP百富勤发布的研报称,比亚迪的汽车业务扩张速度令该行担忧其盈利能力;另一方面,其子公司比亚迪电子(0285.HK)的手机业务贡献,虽然正进一步扩张,但不及预期强劲,该行给予比亚迪“减持”的评级。


9月29日,以18亿港元购入10%在港上市的中国内地最大充电电池制造商比亚迪的股份,短短三个交易日,比亚迪股价飙升89%。

“华尔街多少年?中国资本市场才几年?”上述投资总监说道,“国内证券从业人员毕竟经历的太少,在大牛大熊的转换间还是缺少经验。很多公司的分析师年纪都很小,甚至是80后。没有经历过经济周期的人,你让他们如何能够作出正确的判断?”

“另外,国内的很多投资者会受到制度上的制约。特别是基金经理要受到短期排名和基准业绩比较的羁绊。公司不会给你很多的时间,让你去做长期投资。”该投资总监称。“从这个角度上看,中国和外国的基金公司都差不多。共同基金受到赎回的压力,对冲基金受到投资人的压力。"

read more, click here.....

Tuesday, May 27, 2008

变脸?Face Off?


高盛、瑞银、汇丰等声名显赫的国际大行对SOHO中国成功上市功不可没,高盛、汇丰为其联席保荐人,瑞银担任联席牵头经办人。

  去年10月,在上述大行鼎力包装推销下,潘及其掌控的SOHO中国,以最具影响力的商业领袖和行业领袖的形象,闪亮登陆香港股市,并创下中国内地房地产公司赴港上市融资130亿港元财富神话。

  按去年10月8日的上市首日收盘价9.55元计算,潘及其夫人合计持股市值高达317亿港元,并以此荣登中国富豪排行榜前列。

  然而,成也萧何败也萧何,仅在SOHO中国香港上市后两个月后,高盛、汇丰、瑞银便与潘石屹结束了短暂的蜜月期。

今年1月,汇丰发表研究报告认为,尽管SOHO中国在北京拥有最好地块,属同行盈利水平最高,但土地储备面积非常小,包括前门项目在内共有132万平方米,首次给予中性评级。

  3月,瑞银发表研究报告,虽然维持SOHO中国的买入评级,但把目标价由11港元下调22%至9港元,理由为SOHO管理层推迟注入天安门南项目,以致利润贡献将推迟入账,因此把2009年的纯利预测,由人民币42亿元下调至36亿元。

  5月,高盛证券发表研究报告称,将整体内地房地产股今明两年的净利预测,分别下调42%和50%,同时将内地房地产股票目标价较资产净值折让的幅度,由20%扩大至30%。

  而高盛从确信买进名单剔除的3只内地股票中,就有SOHO中国,其目标价亦由9.19港元降到5.27港元。

  而去年11-12月,瑞银给予SOHO中国的评级为买入,目标价13.00港元其理由为SOHO中国具有独一无二的业务模式:向投资者或用户出售商用物业,而不是建造并出售住宅单位给用户。

  同时,高盛发表报告,将SOHO中国纳入研究股份并将其加入买入名单,目标价12港元。

  当时高盛看多SOHO中国的理由令人难忘:虽然市场对集团获准兴建北京天安门“南门”项目存有较低期望,及市场对集团的其它潜在收购寄望亦不大,不过,按目前公司股价而言,回报有上升空间,因收购整体天安门项目会刺激明年底资产净值上升82%,由现时6.51港元,升至11.84港元,目前股价只反映有关项目只值1.2港元,属过低,SOHO中国目前股价,已低于现有土储的资产价值。

  颇具讽刺意味的是,这些国际大行信誓旦旦看多SOHO中国的观点言犹在耳,不到两个月,就发生前述翻天覆地的变化。

  受上述看空言论影响,潘石屹夫妇持股市值一路暴跌,从上市初期的317亿港元锐减至今的157.89亿港元,市值缩水近160亿港元。

Read more from here。。。。。

Thursday, May 15, 2008

Fear & Greed


Should we fear for the credit crunch that overshadow the global equity market that started since July 2007? The article by Ken Fisher might answer you the question....
Read more about the article here....

"We should fear when others greed and we should greed when others fear."

Tuesday, March 25, 2008

The Rise & Fall of Bear Stearns

Is it a bull, is it a bear? No, it's Bear Stearns!! (Bear Stearns is 5th largest Investment Bank in US while Lehmann Brothers ranked No. 4).

From USD 2.84 (1985) to USD 159.36 before the sharp fall due to subprime crisis, with the offer from JP Morgan of USD 2 per share about a week ago to revised USD 10 yesterday. If you the one of the shareholder, how you feel? Bear in mind that Bear Stearns Book Value (BV) is about USD 84 per share.


"You also have to consider the massive writeoffs that the Street has taken. Thus far, Citigroup has taken $32 billion in writedowns related to the subprime crisis. Merrill Lynch's writedowns have totaled $22 billion. So were Citi's 2006 profits really the reported $21.2 billion, and were Merrill's the reported $7.5 billion? Or was some percentage of that an illusion? If Bear can be sold for $2 or $10 a share, then how solid was Bear Stearns' $84 per share in reported book value?

Thought about more broadly, if commentators are right that mortgage losses alone will total $300 billion to $500 billion, then, as Inker writes, "profits that look like they have been 2.25% of GDP in the past several years have actually been more like 1.75%, if we smooth the losses over the last 3 years and into next year as rough justice." And of course, mortgage losses are only a subset of the total losses.

Think back to what Ken Lewis, the CEO of Bank of America (BAC, Fortune 500), said last fall when his company announced its first round of writedowns: "Making money for several years, only to give most of it back in one year, is not a brilliant business model."

Inker says that the data doesn't point to any firm conclusions about what the level of financial profits should be. His best guess, though, is that a "normal" level of profits would be about half the amount that the financial sector reported in 2006.

Then, you also have to think about the multiple of those earnings that investors should be willing to pay. In a paper published in the fall of 2005, risk management gurus Leslie Rahl and Barbara Lucas of Capital Markets Risk Advisors, noted that in the past decade, a lot of things have happened that aren't supposed to happen, from the interest rate hikes of 1994 to the 1998 collapse of LTCM to the 2001 terrorist attacks. Or as the authors put it, "once-in-a-lifetime events seem to occur every few years."

If that's the case and if such events now mean that Bear Stearns (BSC, Fortune 500) can go from seemingly viable to threatening to bring down the entire financial system in the space of a week - then what sort of multiple should investors pay for Bear, or for any financial firm? Maybe investors shouldn't pay 12 times earnings, and maybe they should pay a discount to, rather than a multiple of, reported book value.

Of course, trying to guess how this will play out is just that - guessing. But if you say, for instance, that Merrill's normalized profits would be half the 2006 level, you get to about $4 billion. If you think that we should be willing to pay a smaller multiple for those earnings than we did in the past - let's be generous and say 10 times - then you get to a total market value for Merrill Lynch of $40 billion. That's still a 10% discount from today's valuation."

Read more from here....



What about if you bought the shares based on rumour that Warren Buffett might take minority stake of Bear Stearns in September 2007 when the price is about USD 123 per share?

Read more from here....

Wednesday, March 12, 2008

Tofu? Kung Fu?


Tofu = Weak, soft
Kung Fu = Macho, strong

What about if Tofu= Macho, strong while Kung Fu= Weak, soft?

While we think the market is strong, does it really strong or the reverse?
While we think the market is weak, does it really weak or the reverse?

Sometimes, what it appears to us is not what it really is. Thus, there is Chinese phrase:

危机 (danger moment) could be a turning point for opportunity to prosper.

Enjoy the MV here....




Saturday, March 01, 2008

Malaysia Airlines System (MAS) Turnaround Master


“We need to set targets that seem like they are impossible to achieve. We got to go for Olympic-level targets. The key thing when you start a journey like this is that you have to conquer the fear of failure. And I was absolutely ready to fail. I needed a prerequisite. To do the impossible, the prerequisite must be that you must conquer the fear of failure,”

"Strategy is cheap. Anybody can do that. The trick is in getting the people to do it. If you have the critical mass that believes in what you want to do, they will run and deliver it. And once results are delivered, even the critics will join in.”

“The last thing we need to do is to declare victory. When people ask me whether are we out of the woods, I say yes we are out from one wood, but we are entering another. And we haven't even conquered the mountain.”

"We are making ourselves wholly transparent. You tell everybody this is your target. By publishing our document, we put tremendous pressure on ourselves and the troops. But we promise the whole world, including the financial community that is the target we are going for. And if we don't do it, we have a problem, because we have already declared it. The first thing that happens in the mind of the organization is that: “We've now put out our targets in the open, lets not make a fool of ourselves, lets go and do it.”

Read more from here....

Wednesday, January 30, 2008

Investor / Trader Lessons from The Kirk Report

Think more. Trade less
• Keep it simple and listen to the market
What should happen does not always happen
• Even the smartest guys in the room make mistakes (negative hedge fund returns, credit markets, etc.)
• There is no rule that the market must act rationally
The market doesn't necessary reflect true economic conditions otherwise the best traders would be economists
• Program trading is changing the market in significant ways
• If you can't articulate what your edge is, then you don't have one!
• Pick your spots. Avoid overtrading
Plan for the worst so you know what to do when it happens
• The market is always right
• Don't try to predict the markets. Look at the current situation the markets are in and base your decision on that situation
• Most of the problems I have had are when I broke my own trading rules. (I said the same thing last year!)
• I must be comfortable with my own system or strategy. It must fit my life, my own strengths, and my time available. Copying someone else's approach just because it works for them probably won't work for me
You must read the markets for what they are and not force what you think they should be doing
• I learned that if you work hard enough, one could improve his/her sense of market sentiment and can more effectively time the market
Everyone has an opinion, but the only one that matters is yours
• The market will do its best to confound the majority
• If there is a perceived bubble, it is probably real and eventually there will be a correction
• Our leaders (central banks) have no control over the financial markets
• No one knows what is going to happen next.
• You get out of the market exactly what you put into it. The harder I work, the luckier I get
• I have so much more to learn
• Trading well doesn't require always being "right" about the market
• Don't expect what worked before to always work in the future
• The markets are becoming more complex and dangerous due to vastly increased use of sophisticated derivative products and due to powerful computer-based trading methods used by large institutions and hedge funds
• No matter how hard you may try, you will never have 100% information on any stock
It's OK to be wrong
I have learned the importance of waiting for the fat pitch to deploy lots of capital (and using stop losses) rather then trying to grind out lots of trades by swinging at "non fat" pitches
• That the market is all about timing and managing your mistakes
• Learning how not to fight the tape is a harder lesson to learn than it seems
• In spite of all of the hype, you can lose a lot of money in options
• Here is what I've learned - I repeat the same mistakes every year
Execution is everything. Just because you know what you should do doesn't mean you will do it
• Now I stick to the highest probability trades. For instance, a up-trending market leader, with an oversold RSI, at the 50-day, in a leading sector, is ripe for a bounce. So, with careful position sizing, I make those trades. I keep detailed spreadsheets, and notes, to keep track of my progress
I have to survive if I ever hope to thrive

Tuesday, January 01, 2008

Securities Analysis The Classic 1951 Edition



Part I
Survey and Approach

Chapter 1
Introduction. The Array of Securities. Economic Background

"He must be able to resist human nature itself sufficiently to mistrust his own feelings when they are part of mass psychology. He must have courage commensurate with his competence."